Harms of AI

Daron Acemoglu

No 29247, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This essay discusses several potential economic, political and social costs of the current path of AI technologies. I argue that if AI continues to be deployed along its current trajectory and remains unregulated, it may produce various social, economic and political harms. These include: damaging competition, consumer privacy and consumer choice; excessively automating work, fueling inequality, inefficiently pushing down wages, and failing to improve worker productivity; and damaging political discourse, democracy's most fundamental lifeblood. Although there is no conclusive evidence suggesting that these costs are imminent or substantial, it may be useful to understand them before they are fully realized and become harder or even impossible to reverse, precisely because of AI's promising and wide-reaching potential. I also suggest that these costs are not inherent to the nature of AI technologies, but are related to how they are being used and developed at the moment - to empower corporations and governments against workers and citizens. As a result, efforts to limit and reverse these costs may need to rely on regulation and policies to redirect AI research. Attempts to contain them just by promoting competition may be insufficient.

JEL-codes: J23 J31 L13 L40 O33 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-com, nep-isf, nep-lma, nep-ltv and nep-reg
Note: EFG IO LS PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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