Circles of Trust: Rival Information in Social Networks

Petra Persson, Nikita Roketskiy () and Samuel Lee

No 29324, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze the diffusion of rival information in a social network. In our model, rational agents can share information sequentially, unconstrained by an exogenous protocol or timing. We show how to compute the set of eventually informed agents for any network, and show that it is essentially unique under altruistic preferences. The relationship between network structure and information diffusion is complex because the former shapes both the charity and confidentiality of potential senders and receivers.

JEL-codes: D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net, nep-ore, nep-pay and nep-ure
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Working Paper: Circles of Trust: Rival Information in Social Networks (2021)
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