The Anatomy of a Hospital System Merger: The Patient Did Not Respond Well to Treatment

Martin Gaynor, Adam Sacarny, Raffaella Sadun, Chad Syverson and Shruthi Venkatesh

No 29449, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Despite the continuing US hospital merger wave, it remains unclear how mergers change, or fail to change, hospital behavior and performance. We open the “black box” of hospital practices through a mega-merger between two for-profit chains. Benchmarking the merger’s effects against the acquirer’s stated aims, we show they achieved some of their goals, harmonizing electronic medical records and sending managers to target hospitals. Post-acquisition managerial processes were similar across the merged chain. However, these interventions failed to drive detectable gains in performance. Our findings demonstrate the importance of organizations for merger research in health care and the economy more generally.

JEL-codes: D22 I11 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hea, nep-ind and nep-reg
Note: EH IO PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w29449.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The anatomy of a hospital system merger: the patient did not respond well to treatment (2022)
Working Paper: The anatomy of a hospital system merger: the patient did not respond well to treatment (2022)
Working Paper: The anatomy of a hospital system merger: the patient did not respond well to treatment (2022)
Working Paper: The Anatomy of a Hospital System Merger: The Patient Did Not Respond Well to Treatment (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29449

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w29449

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().