Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations Revisted

Raquel Fernandez and Robert Rosenthal

No 2981, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The sovereign-debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter. An earlier paper provided a game-theoretic basis for this contention. in that all the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game modeled have an extreme form in which the game's surplus is captured by the creditor. Two related games are analyzed here. Equilibria in which the debtor captures some of the surplus are shown to exist in one of them but not the other, and the roles of various assumptions in all three games is examined.

Date: 1989-05
Note: ITI IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as "Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Negotiations" Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 57, pp. 331-349, (1990).

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w2981.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2981

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w2981

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().