Designing Stress Scenarios
Cecilia Parlatore and
Thomas Philippon ()
No 29901, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We develop a tractable framework to study the optimal design of stress scenarios. A principal wants to manage the unknown risk exposures of a set of agents. She asks the agents to report their losses under hypothetical scenarios before mandating actions to mitigate the exposures. We show how to apply a Kalman filter to solve the learning problem and we characterize the scenario design as a function of the risk environment, the principal’s preferences, and the available remedial actions. We apply our results to banking stress tests. We show how the principal learns from estimated losses under different scenarios and across different banks. Optimal capital requirements are set to cover losses under an adverse scenario while targeted interventions depend on the covariance between residual exposure uncertainty and physical risks.
JEL-codes: D8 G2 H12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-mic and nep-rmg
Note: AP CF EFG ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Designing Stress Scenarios (2022) 
Working Paper: Designing Stress Scenarios (2018) 
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