Credibility and Explicit Inflation Targeting

Robert King () and Yang K. Lu

No 30012, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In his 2004 inflation targeting manifesto, Marvin Goodfriend described US monetary policy as implicit inflation targeting and advocated explicit targeting. Summarizing the 1965-2000 US inflation experience, he highlighted the importance of evolving Fed credibility, which accords with our recent work using a quantitative New Keynesian model. We define credibility as policy consistency with a publicly announced framework and develop two lessons theoretically. First, under explicit targeting, no conflict arises between flexible inflation targeting and maintaining/accumulating credibility. Second, implicit targeting reduces the effectiveness of expectations management and stabilization policy, as well as opening the door to costly inflation scare episodes

JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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