Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action

Louis Kaplow

No 3006, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government policy. Government action - - tax reform, deregulation, judicial decisions, budgetary shifts - - produces gains and losses for those who invested under preexisting rules. The effects of government relief - - compensation, grandfathering, phase-ins - - on ex ante incentives and risk bearing are examined in a model in which private insurance is taken into account. It is demonstrated that government relief is inefficient, even when private insurance is subject to moral hazard, because relief shields individuals from some of the effects of their actions.

Date: 1989-06
Note: PE
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Published as Scandanavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 525-541 (1992).
Published as Kaplow, Louis, 1992. " Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(4), pages 525-41.

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