Incentives and Government Relief for Risk

Louis Kaplow

No 3007, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Government relief is offered for a wide range of risks - - natural disaster, economic dislocation, sickness and injury. This paper explores the effect of such relief on incentives and the allocation of risk in a model with private insurance. It is shown that government relief is inefficient, even when its level is less than the private insurance coverage that individuals would otherwise have purchased and even when private insurance coverage is incomplete due to problems of moral hazard.

Date: 1989-06
Note: PE
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Published as Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 167-175, (1991).

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