The Real State: Inside the Congo's Traffic Police Agency

Raúl Sanchez de la Sierra, Kristof Titeca, Haoyang (Stan) Xie, Albert Malukisa Nkuku and Aimable Amani Lameke

No 30258, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper provides insight into a corruption scheme in Kinshasa’s traffic police agency. First, various data collection branches show that the agency’s revenue is five times that from fines and is derived from a coalition of traffic police officials, their managers, and judicial police officers scheming to extort drivers. Second, the analysis of an experiment suggests that the scheme subverts service. Third, the scheme appears to be a rational response to the context but its logic is widespread. The findings suggest that coalitions of officials, while being socially costly, can yield large illicit revenue, challenging the notion of state weakness.

JEL-codes: D23 D73 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
Note: DEV IO LE PE POL
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