Does the Squeaky Wheel Get More Grease? The Direct and Indirect Effects of Citizen Participation on Environmental Governance in China

Mark Buntaine, Michael Greenstone, Guojun He, Mengdi Liu, Shaoda Wang and Bing Zhang

No 30539, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We conducted a nationwide field experiment in China to evaluate the direct and indirect impacts of assigning firms to public or private citizen appeals when they violate pollution standards. There are three main findings. First, public appeals to the regulator through social media substantially reduce violations and pollution emissions, while private appeals cause more modest environmental improvements. Second, public appeals appear to tilt regulators’ focus away from facilitating economic growth and toward avoiding pollution-induced public unrest. Third, pollution reductions by treated firms are not offset by control firms, based on randomly varying the proportion of treatment firms at the prefecture-level.

JEL-codes: K32 P28 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-exp
Note: DEV EEE LE PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Mark T. Buntaine & Michael Greenstone & Guojun He & Mengdi Liu & Shaoda Wang & Bing Zhang, 2024. "Does the Squeaky Wheel Get More Grease? The Direct and Indirect Effects of Citizen Participation on Environmental Governance in China," American Economic Review, vol 114(3), pages 815-850.

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Journal Article: Does the Squeaky Wheel Get More Grease? The Direct and Indirect Effects of Citizen Participation on Environmental Governance in China (2024)
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