The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution

Guido Tabellini

No 3058, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper studies the political-economic equilibrium of a two-period model with overlapping generations. In each period the policy is chosen under majority rule by the generations currently alive. The paper identifies a "sustainable set" of values for public debt. Any amount of debt within this set is fully repaid in equilibrium, even in the absence of commitments. By issuing debt within this set, the first generation of voters redistributes revenue in its favor and away from the second generation. The paper characterizes the determinants of the equilibrium intergenerational redistribution carried out in this way, and points to a difference between debt policy and social security legislation as instruments of redistribution. The key features of the model are heterogeneity within each generation and altruism across generations.

Date: 1989-08
Note: ME
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published as Tabellini, Guido. "The Politics Of Intergenerational Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, 1991, v99(2), 335-357.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3058.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3058

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3058

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (wpc@nber.org).