Collaboration Between and Within Groups

Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros and Parth Parihar

No 30656, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the ability of multi-group teams to undertake binary projects in a decentralized environment. The equilibrium outcomes of our model display familiar features in collaborative settings, including inefficient gradualism, inaction, and contribution cycles, wherein groups alternate taking responsibility for moving the project forward. Expected delay grows more than proportionally with project size, and some welfare-enhancing projects are not completed, even as agents become arbitrarily patient. A team composed of two equally large groups can complete larger projects than a fully homogenous team, even as the difference in preferences for completion among the two groups is arbitrarily small. Moreover, if the project is sufficiently large, the two-group team always completes the project strictly faster.

JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-ppm and nep-soc
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