Endogenous Exchange Rate Regime Switches

Gabriel de Koch and Vittorio Grilli

No 3066, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper we demonstrate that exchange rate regime switching is compatible with optimal government policies. Nominal exchange-rate regimes are formalized as equilibrium commitments on future seigniorage policies, and the collapse of an exchange-rate peg as an excusable default which allows the government to lump-sum tax private sector money holdings. We demonstrate that a regime in which the exchange-rate peg is allowed to collapse when government spending is unusually high is a trigger-strategy equilibrium. Such a regime can be superior to both fixed and flexible exchange rate because it combines some of the flexibility of the floating exchange rates with some of the benefits of precommitment afforded by fixed rates.

Date: 1989-08
Note: ITI IFM
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