Fundamentally Reforming the DI System: Evidence from German Notch Cohorts
Bjoern Fischer,
Bjoern Fischer,
Nicolas R. Ziebarth and
Nicolas R. Ziebarth
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Nicolas Robert Ziebarth (),
Björn Fischer-Weckemann and
Johannes Geyer
No 30812, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
In 2001, Germany abolished public occupational disability insurance (ODI)—the second tier of public DI—for post-1960 cohorts. First, overall DI inflows decreased by a third in the long run. Second, representative data show at best modest increases in private ODI take-up in an individual risk-rated market without guaranteed issue. Third, an equilibrium model featuring interactions between the safety net, the first tier of public DI, and the private market illustrates that coverage denials and weak insurance demand due to complementary social insurance produce modest private ODI take-up with steep gradients by income and health. Finally, we simulate complementary reforms.
JEL-codes: H53 H55 I10 I14 I18 J14 J21 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-hea, nep-lma and nep-pbe
Note: AG EH LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Forthcoming in the Review of Economics and Statistics
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