The Unintended Consequences of Test-Based Remediation
David Figlio and
Umut Özek
No 30831, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
School systems around the world use achievement tests to assign students to schools, classes, and instructional resources, including remediation. Using a regression discontinuity design, we study a Florida policy that places middle school students who score below a proficiency cutoff into remedial classes. Students scoring below the cutoff receive more educational resources, but they are also placed in classes that are more segregated by race, socio-economic status, and prior achievement. Increased tracking occurs not only in the remedial subject, but also in other core subjects. These tracking effects are significantly larger and more likely to persist beyond the year of remediation for Black students.
JEL-codes: I21 I24 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01
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Published as David Figlio & Umut Ozek, 2024. "The Unintended Consequences of Test-Based Remediation," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, vol 16(1), pages 60-89.
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Journal Article: The Unintended Consequences of Test-Based Remediation (2024) 
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