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Cross-State Strategic Voting

Gordon Dahl, Joseph Engelberg, Runjing Lu and William Mullins

No 30972, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We estimate 3% of the U.S. voter population is registered to vote in two states. Which state these double-registrants choose to vote in reflects incentives and costs, being more prevalent in swing states (higher incentive) and states which automatically send out mail-in ballots (lower cost). We call this behavior cross-state strategic voting (CSSV) and estimate there were 317,000 such votes in the 2020 presidential election. Because both Democrats and Republicans engaged in CSSV, the net effect was small, although it could matter in closer elections (e.g., Florida in 2000) or if one party increased CSSV relative to the other.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: LE PE POL
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