Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy

Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin

No 31187, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Many, if not most, personalistic dictatorships end up with a disastrous decision such as Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, Hirohito’s government launching a war against the United States, or Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if the decision is not ultimately fatal for the regime, such as Mao’s Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot’s collectivization drive, they typically involve both a monumental miscalculation and an institutional environment in which better-informed subordinates have no chance to prevent the decision from being implemented. We offer a dynamic model of non-democratic politics, in which repression and bad decision-making are self-reinforcing. Repressions reduce the threat, yet raise the stakes for the incumbent; with higher stakes, the incumbent puts more emphasis on loyalty than competence. Our theory sheds light on the mechanism of disastrous individual decisions in highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes.

JEL-codes: C73 D72 D83 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-tra
Note: POL
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Working Paper: Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy (2023)
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