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Universalism and Political Representation: Evidence from the Field

Benjamin Enke, Raymond Fisman, Luis Mota Freitas and Steven Sun

No 31265, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper provides field evidence on the link between morals and political behavior. We develop a theory-guided real-stakes measure of each U.S. district's values on the universalism-particularism continuum, which reflects the degree to which charitable giving decreases as a function of social distance. District universalism is strongly predictive of local Democratic vote shares, legislators' roll-call voting, and the moral content of Congressional speeches. These results hold in both across- and within-party analyses. Overall, spatial heterogeneity in universalism is a substantially stronger predictor of geographic variation in political outcomes than traditional economic variables such as income or education.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as Benjamin Enke & Raymond Fisman & Luis Mota Freitas & Steven Sun, 2024. "Universalism and Political Representation: Evidence from the Field," American Economic Review: Insights, vol 6(2), pages 214-229.

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