Political Preferences and Transport Infrastructure: Evidence from California’s High-Speed Rail

Pablo D. Fajgelbaum, Cecile Gaubert, Nicole Gorton, Eduardo Morales and Edouard Schaal

No 31438, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how political preferences shaped California’s High-Speed Rail (CHSR), a large transportation project approved by referendum in 2008. Voters’ support responded significantly to the projected economic gains in their tract of residence, as measured by a quantitative model of high-speed rail matched to CHSR plans. Given this response, a revealed-preference approach comparing the proposed network with alternative designs identifies strong planner’s preferences for political support. The optimal politically-blind design would have placed the stations nearer to California’s dense metro areas, where it was harder to sway votes, thus increasing the projected economic gains.

JEL-codes: D72 O18 R10 R42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol, nep-tre and nep-ure
Note: ITI POL
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