Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Ori Heffetz and Clayton Thomas

No 31506, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A menu description presents a mechanism to player i in two steps. Step (1) uses the reports of other players to describe i’s menu: the set of i’s potential outcomes. Step (2) uses i’s report to select i’s favorite outcome from her menu. Can menu descriptions better expose strategyproofness, without sacrificing simplicity? We propose a new, simple menu description of Deferred Acceptance. We prove that—in contrast with other common matching mechanisms—this menu description must differ substantially from the corresponding traditional description. We demonstrate, with a lab experiment on two elementary mechanisms, the promise and challenges of menu descriptions.

JEL-codes: D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-mic
Note: EH LS PE
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