Information Aggregation in Stratified Societies

Marina Agranov, Ran Eilat and Konstantin Sonin

No 31510, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze a model of political competition in which the elite forms endogenously to aggregate information and advise the uninformed median voter which candidate to choose. The median voter knows whether or not the endorsed candidate is biased toward the elites, but might still prefer the biased candidate if the elite’s endorsement provides sufficient information about her competence. The elite size and the degree of information aggregation by the elite depend on the extent to which the median voter follows the elite’s advice. A higher cost of redistribution minimizes the elite’s information advantage, hinders information transmission, and decreases the expected competence of the elected politician.

JEL-codes: D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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