From Retributive to Restorative: An Alternative Approach to Justice in Schools

Anjali Adukia, Benjamin Feigenberg and Fatemeh Momeni

No 31675, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: School districts historically approached conflict-resolution from the perspective that suspending disruptive students was necessary to protect their classmates, even if this caused harm to perceived offenders. Restorative practices (RP) – focused on reparation, accountability, and shared ownership of disciplinary justice – are designed to address undesirable behavior without harming students. We study Chicago Public Schools’ adoption of RP and find that suspensions and arrests decreased, driven by effects for Black students. We find null effects on test-score value added, ruling out meaningful average declines. We estimate a 15% decrease in out-of-school arrests, consistent with RP substantively changing student behavior.

JEL-codes: I0 I20 I21 I24 J0 J01 J08 J18 K39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
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