Provider Payment Incentives: Evidence From The U.S. Hospice Industry
Norma Coe and
David A. Rosenkranz
No 31691, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
Moral hazard and provider-induced demand may contribute to overutilization of scarce health care resources. The U.S. health care system includes several compensatory cost-containment mechanisms, but their effects depend on how patients and providers respond. We investigate hospice programs’ responses to a cap in the Medicare hospice benefit on their average annual payments per patient. We estimate their intensive margin responses to the cap by leveraging variation in cap-related financial incentives generated by the policy’s nonlinear design and the transition between fiscal years. We find that programs on track to exceed the cap in the last three months of a fiscal year raise their enrollment rates by 5.7% and their live discharge rates by 4.3% on average, reducing their cap liabilities. The marginal enrollees have longer average remaining lifetimes and are less likely to have been recently hospitalized. Their hospice spells are also more likely to be fragmented by subsequent live discharges. On the extensive margin, we find that cap liabilities are associated with terminations of Medicare provider certification numbers, suggesting that the cap impacts market structure. Current policy discussions about reducing the cap should consider its potential effect on market structure.
JEL-codes: I0 I1 I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
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