Consumer Surveillance and Financial Fraud

Bo Bian, Michaela Pagel, Huan Tang and Devesh Raval

No 31692, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In today’s digital economy, firms near constantly collect, analyze, and profit from consumers’ personal information, which might expose consumers to financial fraud. We examine the effects of Apple’s App Tracking Transparency (ATT) policy, which significantly curtailed data collection and sharing on the iOS platform. Using zip code level variation in iOS user shares, we show that ATT substantially reduced fraud complaints. The effects are concentrated in complaints that have more relevant narratives and in complaints about companies engaging in intensive consumer surveillance and lacking data safeguards. Our evidence quantifies one of the main harms of lax privacy standards.

JEL-codes: G5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
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Note: CF LE
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