Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums? The Evidence on Contract Wages

Joshua Rosett

No 3187, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: I estimate changes in levels of union real wage growth associated with corporate takeovers and accompanying chief executive officer changes. The effects are statistically insignificant. The results are used to construct union wealth changes associated with corporate control events. Target fire shareholder wealth premiums are estimated using a simple market model. The union and shareholder wealth changes are compared, and I conclude that transfers of wealth from unions to shareholders ate not an economically significant explanation of shareholder wealth premiums.

Date: 1989-11
Note: LS ME
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Published as JFEC, Vol. 27, no. 1 (1990): 263-282.

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