Regulating Artificial Intelligence

Joao Guerreiro, Sergio Rebelo and Pedro Teles

No 31921, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Advances in AI offer substantial benefits but also pose societal risks. We analyze optimal regulation under uncertainty about societal costs, differing expectations regarding risks, and opportunities to reduce uncertainty through experimentation like beta testing and red teaming. Pigouvian taxes fail to achieve the first-best outcome due to heterogeneous beliefs about risks and the regulator’s inability to observe developers’ expectations. We propose a two-stage optimal policy: first, deciding between immediate release or sandbox experimentation; second, using gathered information to determine whether to publicly release or withdraw the algorithm. This approach achieves the socially optimal outcome.

JEL-codes: H21 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ain, nep-cmp and nep-reg
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Related works:
Working Paper: Regulating Artificial Intelligence (2023)
Working Paper: Regulating Artificial Intelligence (2023)
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