Can Socially-Minded Governance Control the AGI Beast?

Joshua Gans

No 31924, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper robustly concludes that it cannot. A model is constructed under idealised conditions that presume the risks associated with artificial general intelligence (AGI) are real, that safe AGI products are possible, and that there exist socially-minded funders who are interested in funding safe AGI even if this does not maximise profits. It is demonstrated that a socially-minded entity formed by such funders would not be able to minimise harm from AGI that might be created by unrestricted products released by for-profit firms. The reason is that a socially-minded entity has neither the incentive nor ability to minimise the use of unrestricted AGI products in ex post competition with for-profit firms and cannot preempt the AGI developed by for-profit firms ex ante.

JEL-codes: L20 O33 O36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-reg
Note: PR
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