Deadlines Versus Continuous Incentives: Evidence from the Patent Office

Michael D. Frakes and Melissa F. Wasserman

No 32066, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A quota system with an associated deadline may retain the possibility of worker procrastination and related deadline behaviors. A performance appraisal system based on continuous temporal incentives, on the other hand, has the potential to alleviate deadline effects but may lose some of the quality-related benefits associated with the flexibility of a quota/deadline system. We explore these tradeoffs by observing patent examiner behavior and examination quality outcomes surrounding a 2011 reform at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that built on its bi-weekly quota system by adding a set of bonuses tied to daily examination-pendency measures. We find a substantial reduction in deadline effects and near complete temporal smoothing in examiner behavior in connection with the reform, leading to large reductions in average examination pendency while resulting in no corresponding reductions in the accuracy of examinations.

JEL-codes: D03 J33 K0 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-hrm, nep-ipr and nep-lma
Note: LE PR
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