Enforcement Risk and Screening in Rental Markets: Evidence from Eviction Moratoria

Alina Arefeva, Kay Jowers, Qihui Hu and Christopher Timmins

No 32289, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We combine a hand-collected dataset on state eviction moratoria with a nationwide field experiment of more than 25,000 rental inquiries to study how contract enforcement affects screening in rental housing markets. Using staggered moratorium expirations, we show that property managers discriminated more against minority renters when eviction enforcement was suspended. Linking inquiries to tenant address histories, we find that non-responses translated into different move-in patterns and reduced property owners’ returns through foregone leasing opportunities. A simple search model rationalizes these responses as property managers re-optimize when enforcement is suspended.

JEL-codes: D83 G18 G21 G32 J15 R31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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