Nothing for Something: Marketing Cancer Drugs to Physicians Increases Prescribing Without Improving Mortality

Colleen Carey, Michael Daly and Jing Li

No 32336, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Physicians commonly receive marketing-related transfers from drug firms. We examine the impact of these relationships on the prescribing of physician-administered cancer drugs in Medicare. We find that prescribing of the associated drug increases 4\% in the twelve months after a payment is received, with the increase beginning sharply in the month of payment and fading out within a year. A marketing payment also leads physicians to begin treating cancer patients with lower expected mortality. While payments result in greater expenditure on cancer drugs, there are no associated improvements in patient mortality.

JEL-codes: I11 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ind
Note: EH
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w32336.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32336

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w32336

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().