Three Things about Mobile App Commissions

Joshua Gans

No 32339, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Mobile app commissions paid by app developers to a monopolist device maker/app store operator are examined. Three results are demonstrated. First, unregulated app commissions are set at a level that maximises consumer surplus. Second, eliminating app commissions will lead to higher device prices. Third, requiring a menu of options for consumers as to how device makers receive subsidies from app developers constrains app commissions in a way that provides a more equal balance between consumer versus app developer interests.

JEL-codes: L11 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-inv, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-reg
Note: IO PR
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