Predicting Police Misconduct

Greg Stoddard, Dylan J. Fitzpatrick and Jens Ludwig

No 32432, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Whether police misconduct can be prevented depends partly on whether it can be predicted. We show police misconduct is partially predictable and that estimated misconduct risk is not simply an artifact of measurement error or a proxy for officer activity. We also show many officers at risk of on-duty misconduct have elevated off-duty risk too, suggesting a potential link between accountability and officer wellness. We show that targeting preventive interventions even with a simple prediction model – number of past complaints, which is not as predictive as machine learning but lower-cost to deploy – has marginal value of public funds of infinity.

JEL-codes: C0 K0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-mac and nep-ure
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