Dynamic Collective Action and the Power of Large Numbers

Marco Battaglini and Thomas Palfrey

No 32473, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Individuals in a group decide over time whether or not to participate in a collective action. The cost of participation is private information, and a minimum number of participants is required for success. Individuals have incentives to delay their decisions to observe the commitments of others, resulting in complex equilibrium dynamics. While the probability of success is always positive, there is a positive probability that the process halts before success is achieved. For large groups, success is either achieved instantly or never, depending on the rate at which the required number of participants diverges to infinity.

JEL-codes: D71 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: POL
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Working Paper: Dynamic Collective Action and the Power of Large Numbers (2024)
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