The Impact of Affirmative Action Litigation on Police Killings of Civilians
Robynn J.A. Cox,
Jamein P. Cunningham and
Alberto Ortega
No 32502, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
Although research has shown that court-ordered hiring quotas increase the number of minority police officers in litigated cities, there has been little insight into how workforce diversity, or lack thereof, may impact police violence against civilians. Using an event study framework, we find that the threat of affirmative action litigation reduces police killings of non-White civilians in the long-run. In addition, we find evidence of lower arrest rates for non-White civilians and more diverse police departments 25 years after litigation. Our results highlight the vital role that federal interventions have in addressing police behavior and the use of lethal force.
JEL-codes: I28 J15 J78 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-law and nep-ure
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