The Political Economy of Industrial Policy

Réka Juhász and Nathaniel Lane

No 32507, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We examine the ways in which political realities shape industrial policy through the lens of modern political economy. We consider two broad “governance constraints”: i) the political forces that shape how industrial policy is chosen and ii) the ways in which state capacity affects implementation. The framework of modern political economy suggests that government failure is not a necessary feature of industrial policy; rather, it is more likely to emerge when countries pursue industrial policies beyond their governance capacity constraints. As such, our political economy of industrial policy is not fatalist. Instead, it enables policymakers to constructively confront challenges.

JEL-codes: L52 O25 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-pol
Note: DEV ITI POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w32507.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
Journal Article: The Political Economy of Industrial Policy (2024)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Industrial Policy (2024)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Industrial Policy (2024)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Industrial Policy (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32507

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w32507
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().