What is Newsworthy? Theory and Evidence

Luis Armona, Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica and Jesse Shapiro

No 32512, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We introduce a model in which a benevolent news outlet decides whether to report the realization of a state to a consumer, who pays a cost to receive it. A simple statistical rule, called a proper scoring rule, describes when the outlet should be more likely to report the realization. Using data from the US television news, we show that a particular scoring rule successfully predicts many salient features of news reporting. We show how to use this rule as a control variable to discipline tests of reporting bias, and we show that controlling for it matters in our applications.

JEL-codes: C44 D83 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
Note: IO POL
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