Paying Your Fair Share: Perceived Fairness and Tax Compliance
Brad C. Nathan,
Ricardo Perez-Truglia and
Alejandro Zentner
No 32588, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We provide evidence on the role of fairness for tax compliance: households are willing to pay more in taxes if they believe that other households are contributing their fair share. We conducted an information-disclosure natural field experiment in the context of property taxes in the United States. We induced exogenous shocks to households' perceptions about the average tax rate paid by other households. We find that a higher perceived average tax rate decreases the probability of filing a tax appeal. Translating our estimates into a money metric, we find that for each additional $1 contributed by the average household, a taxpayer is willing to pay an extra $0.43 in his or her own taxes.
JEL-codes: C93 H4 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
Note: PE POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w32588.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32588
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w32588
The price is Paper copy available by mail.
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().