Risk and Specialization in Covered-Interest Arbitrage

Tobias J. Moskowitz, Chase Ross, Sharon Y. Ross and Kaushik Vasudevan

No 32707, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Prevailing theories of financial intermediation assume an integrated financial sector with frictionless risk-sharing. However, we identify substantial risk-sharing frictions linked to intermediary specialization using the cross-section of covered-interest parity (CIP) deviations as a laboratory. Obtaining confidential supervisory data covering $25 trillion in daily bank exposures, we document that CIP arbitrage is risky for banks, which take on maturity mismatches and purchase risky assets to hedge their currency exposure from derivatives. These risks lead intermediaries to specialize in markets where they have expertise in managing them. Our results highlight the importance of intermediary specialization and its impact on risk premia.

JEL-codes: F3 F31 G1 G11 G12 G15 G2 G20 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn
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