On the Origins of Direct Rule: Armed Groups and Customary Chiefs in Eastern Congo

Soeren Henn, Gauthier Marchais, Christian Mastaki Mugaruka and Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra

No 32722, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Armed groups routinely delegate domains of rule to village customary chiefs—indirect rule. The larger a chief’s power over the villagers relative to the group’s, the more there is indirect rule. Over time, enabled by the chief’s efforts to legitimize the group, the group expands the taxes they collect themselves in addition to those collected by the chief for them and substitutes the chief for justice administration—converging to direct rule. This suggests indirect rule is a temporary arrangement by uninformed or illegitimate rulers with an inherent agency problem, overcome when rulers acquire enough skill to replace pre-existing political authorities.

JEL-codes: O17 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07
Note: DEV IO PE POL
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