Pocketbook Politics: The Impact of Wealth on Political Preferences and Participation

Anton Brännlund, David Cesarini, Karl-Oskar Lindgren, Erik Lindqvist, Sven Oskarsson and Robert Östling

No 32777, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The rich tend to support policies favoring the affluent and are over-represented among both voters and legislators. This paper investigates whether these correlations reflect causal effects of wealth by leveraging random, positive wealth shocks in the form of lottery prizes. Compared to suitably matched controls, large-prize winners are no more likely to cast votes in national elections or run for political office. We also find no significant effects of parents’ lottery winnings on their children’s political participation. But winners of large lottery prizes become more negative toward taxes on wealth, real estate and inheritances. Although we do not detect any statistically significant effects on other political preferences, effects tend to go in the direction of a more right-wing political orientation. We find no evidence that lottery wealth changes moral values or strengthen beliefs in the importance of hard work for success in life.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: POL
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