Inefficient Labor Market Sorting

Carsten Eckel and Stephen Yeaple

No 32797, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A growing empirical literature attributes much of the productivity advantages of large, "superstar" firms to their adoption of best practice management techniques that allow them to better identify and use talented workers. The reasons for the incomplete adoption of these "structured management practices" (SMPs) and their welfare implications are not well understood. This paper provides a positive and normative analysis of these issues in a theoretical framework in which SMPs induce sorting of talent across firms. Incomplete adoption arises because SMPs are costly and worker talent is in limited supply. In equilibrium there is excessive adoption of SMPs and too much sorting of talented workers into large firms. In this second-best environment, policy changes that favor large firms, such as trade liberalization, have the potential to lower welfare.

JEL-codes: F12 F16 J31 J33 J42 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lma
Note: ITI
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as Carsten Eckel & Stephen R. Yeaple, 2024. "Inefficient Labor Market Sorting," Journal of Economic Theory, .

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Journal Article: Inefficient labor market sorting (2024)
Working Paper: Inefficient Labor Market Sorting (2023)
Working Paper: Inefficient Labor Market Sorting (2023)
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