Fear and Dreams: Understanding the Non-Institutional sources of Leader Strategy

Maria Angélica Bautista, Juan Galán, James Robinson, Rafael F. Torres and Ragnar Torvik

No 33011, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Political leaders make policy choices which are often hard to explain via institutions. We use the behavior of Colombian paramilitary groups as an environment to study non-institutional sources of variation in how public good provision and violence are combined to control populations. We hypothesize that a significant source of variation stems from the social preferences of the paramilitary commanders. Reciprocators adopt a strategy of offering public goods in exchange for support, but also use violence to punish those who do not reciprocate back. Reciprocity, developed via childhood socialization, is a characteristic of rural “peasants”. We develop a model which generates these hypotheses and test them using a unique dataset compiled from transitional justice documents.

JEL-codes: D7 D9 H42 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-09
Note: POL
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Working Paper: Fear and Dreams: Understanding the Non-Institutional Sources of Leader Strategy (2024)
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