Service Quality on Online Platforms: Empirical Evidence about Driving Quality at Uber

Susan Athey, Juan Castillo and Bharat Chandar

No 33087, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Online marketplaces have adopted new quality control mechanisms that can accommodate a flexible pool of providers. In the context of ride-hailing, we measure the effectiveness of these mechanisms, which include ratings, incentives, and behavioral nudges. Using telemetry data as an objective measure of quality, we find that drivers not only respond to user preferences but also improve their behavior after receiving warnings about their low ratings. Furthermore, we use data from a randomized experiment to show that informing drivers about their past behavior improves quality, especially for low-performing drivers. Lastly, we find that UberX drivers exhibit behavior comparable to that of UberTaxi drivers, suggesting that Uber’s new quality control mechanisms successfully maintain a high level of service quality.

JEL-codes: J28 J48 L50 L91 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-lma, nep-nud, nep-reg and nep-tre
Note: IO
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Working Paper: Service Quality on Online Platforms: Empirical Evidence about Driving Quality at Uber (2024)
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