The Politics of Global Public Goods

Bard Harstad

No 33162, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Below, I illustrate how a wide range of political economics forces influence nations' provisions of global public goods. The forces can make it difficult for international cooperation to succeed, but they can also be taken advantage of by carefully designed treaties, so that they are stronger because of the domestic political forces. The chapter concludes that global cooperation and democratization reinforce each other, so that multiple equilibrium outcomes are possible. The models are simple and the text is accessible to students at any level.

JEL-codes: H0 P0 Q0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
Note: EEE PE POL
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