Beyond Bruen: Can Firearm Training Replace Local Discretion in Concealed Carry Permitting?

John Donohue, Matthew Benavides, Amy L. Zhang and Alex Oktay

No 33240, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The 2022 Supreme Court case NYSRPA v. Bruen struck down states’ discretion in issuing individuals firearm right-to-carry permits. As the country transitions towards more and more permissive concealed carry regulation, it has remained unclear how permitting processes and requirements affect personal and public safety. Leveraging a novel dataset of state laws spanning 2000- 2022, we find that more stringent concealed carry requirements, such as higher fees or more training hours, do not deter gun owners from obtaining carrying licenses, nor do they alter their behavior substantially enough to impact public safety outcomes including violent crimes, gun theft, or accidental shootings. As such, stricter training requirements are unable to counteract the effects of more permissive concealed carry issuance.

JEL-codes: H0 K0 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12
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