When Given Discretion Teachers Did Not Shirk: Evidence from Remedial Education in Secondary Schools

Sabrin Beg, Anne E. Fitzpatrick, Jason Kerwin, Adrienne Lucas and Khandker Wahedur Rahman

No 33242, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Public-sector organizations face a tradeoff: allowing workers discretion at the point of service to adapt to local needs, versus rigid harmonization to ensure uniform service delivery. We examine this tradeoff in the context of secondary schools in Odisha, India, where the centrally set curriculum is nearly 4 grades above the learning levels of the mean student. We conduct a randomized intervention that assigned schools to either a rigid or a flexible version of a remedial learning intervention that displaced the curriculum. We compare learning outcomes and teaching quality to the status quo. Both interventions increased learning by 0.11SD, about 60 percent of a year of learning, with gains throughout the learning distribution. We find no crowd-out of grade-level mastery, and no change in the likelihood of earning passing Board Marks one year later. Discretion did not lower the quality of implementation or induce shirking. Allowing teachers flexibility to adjust classroom content to student needs was beneficial and had limited downsides.

JEL-codes: H40 I25 I28 J24 M54 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12
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