Capital Flight and Tax Competition: Are There Viable Solutions to Both Problems?
Alberto Giovannini and
James Hines ()
No 3333, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
This paper discusses a model corporate tax system based on the application of the residence principle. This tax system, while preserving national sovereignties, minimizes the distortions from international capital mobility. The paper is motivated by an analysis of European capital income tax systems, and of the distortions they might give rise to as obstacles to international capital flows diminish. The alternative system we analyze has two main properties: it exploits the territoriality of law enforcement, and allows countries to set the corporate tax rate - and the extent of double taxation of corporate income - independently from their partners. The paper concludes with some suggestive evidence of the potential revenue effects among European countries of this tax system.
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Published as European Financial Integration, A. Giovannini and C. Mayer, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991., p. 172-210
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Working Paper: Capital Flight and Tax Competition: Are there Viable Solutions to Both Problems (1990)
Working Paper: CAPITAL FLIGHT AND TAX COMPETITION: ARE THERE VIABLE SOLUTIONS TO BOTH PROBLEMS? (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3333
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