Welfare Effects of Buyer and Seller Power
Mert Demirer and
Michael Rubens
No 33371, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We examine the welfare effects of buyer and seller power in vertically related markets and introduce an empirical approach for quantifying the contribution of each to market power distortions. Our model nests both monopsony distortions from buyer power and double-marginalization distortions from seller power. Rather than imposing either distortion by assumption, we analyze welfare effects when the source of the distortion is unknown. We characterize when buyer and seller power are countervailing or distortionary, offer a test to separate them empirically, and discuss implications for collective bargaining and merger policy. We demonstrate the application of our model in three empirical settings to examine whether (i) labor unions countervail employer monopsony power, (ii) agricultural cooperatives induce double marginalization, and (iii) vertical distortions in coal procurement stem from monopoly or monopsony power.
JEL-codes: J42 L10 L41 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-ind and nep-reg
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