Minimum Wage Laws and Job Search

Vitor C. Melo, Christopher Kaiser, David Neumark, Liya Palagashvili and Michael D. Farren

No 33433, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Simple theoretical models of job search can imply that a higher minimum wage increases the number of job seekers for affected jobs. Researchers often appeal to these models in defending or explaining non-negative estimated employment effects of minimum wages. We use novel data on job search in U.S. states to examine the effect of minimum wage increases on the number of job seekers for low-skilled positions. We find little if any evidence that higher minimum wages increase job search for low-skilled jobs, and more evidence that higher minimum wages decrease the number of workers seeking employment in these jobs.

JEL-codes: J23 J38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Vitor Melo & Christopher M. Kaiser & David Neumark & Liya Palagashvili & Michael D. Farren, 2026. "Minimum wage laws and job search," Journal of Public Economics, vol 262.

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