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Expropriation Without Compensation: Copper in Chile, 1970-1973

Sebastian Edwards

No 33572, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this essay, I analyze the nationalization of large copper mines during Salvador Allende’s socialist government in Chile in the 1970s. This is one of the earliest cases “nationalization without compensation.” Chile’s legal argument was based on the novel idea that “adequate” payment should be calculated as book value minus “excessive profits.” In turn, excessive profits were defined, for every year, as profits above 12% of book value. I analyze the economic arguments that led to nationalization, and I deconstruct and critically evaluate the methodology used to calculate “excessive profits” and “adequate compensation.” I analyze the US and multinationals’ response to Chile’s nationalization policies.

JEL-codes: K41 N51 O13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03
Note: DEV IFM ITI
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